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Abstract 
 
The ubiquitous yet amorphous concept of participation has resulted in much critical 
debate on its impact and outcomes at both micro (project) and macro (policy) levels. 
In highlighting what some have termed the ‘tyranny’ of participation, these debates 
have also provided valuable insights into how participative spaces might be rendered 
more transformative.  But to what extent have these contributions informed policy and 
practice on the ground, most particularly within agencies and among practitioners 
supporting so-called participatory initiatives?   
 
Drawing on field research conducted in 2011 on local governance in Burundi, in this 
article I argue that the lessons and contributions from the literature have failed to 
impact upon international support to local governance developments in Burundi.  
Findings on direct and representative participation in local governance structures 
together with public and official understandings of what such participation means 
show continuities with the top-down, hierarchical and ultimately marginalising 
practices of the past.   I conclude with some lessons aimed at realising the 
transformative potential of the opportunities offered by the reforms currently in place.   
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction: Community participation: The potential and the pitfalls 
 
Like it or loathe it, participation as a concept underpinning both micro (project) and 
macro (policy) level development seems here to stay.  From its roots in needs-based 
development in the 1970s and 1980s to its widespread adoption by mainstream 
agencies and policy makers in the global shift from governing to governance in the 
1990s (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992; Kooiman, 1993), participation has emerged as a 
core concept underpinning local and national development policies and strategies 
alike.  Its ascension to the mainstream in international development circles is possibly 
best exemplified by its adoption by the World Bank and other donors as a central 
concept underpinning both national level Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers 
(PRSPs) and local level decentralisation programmes adopted in over 80 per cent of 
developing countries from the 1990s onward.  More recently, as criticisms of overly 
top-down, elite level peace-building strategies in post-conflict zones grows, 
community-based participatory approaches are also increasingly advocated as part of 
internationally supported peace-building strategies in these contexts (Berdal, 2009; 
Autessere, 2010; Kilroy, 2011).  For proponents of participation, its advantages lie in 
its capacity to foster a sense of shared purpose, ownership and responsibility among 
fractured communities, in the process building social capital and enhancing state 
legitimacy (see for example DfID, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2007; World Bank, 2011). 
 
This rapid rise in popularity for participation among policy-makers and practitioners 
has been accompanied by a lively critical debate on its merits or otherwise.  This 
discussion has been both timely and fruitful in that it has helped lift some of the 
conceptual haze surrounding this ambiguous ‘buzzword’ (Cornwall and Brock, 2005) 
highlighting, on the one hand, its power to radically transform political relations, yet 
on the other, its potential for exploitation, marginalisation and social control.  Some 
are strident in their criticism, notably the contributors to the provocatively entitled 
Participation: The New Tyranny? (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) who, focusing largely 
on micro-level Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs), argue that so-called 
participatory approaches often fail to engage with issues of power and politics, in the 
process depoliticising local development processes.  Others however, through their 
useful typologies or ladders of participation (see Arnstein, 1969; Pretty, 1995; and 
White, 1996), highlight the multiple contested meanings of the concept and draw 
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attention to the consequent range of outcomes possible.  Thus for some, participation 
may indeed serve to legitimise decisions already made – as many of the contributors 
to the Tyranny collection assert.  For others, it may serve a purely instrumental 
function, making projects and activities more cost effective by drawing on 
communities’ own resources.  And for others again, it may aim at empowerment – 
strengthening communities’ confidence and abilities to take decisions, hold political 
leaders to account and ultimately control their own destinies.   
 
For those interested in this latter, more transformative meaning of participation – and 
this is where much of the recent peace-building literature appears to point (Berdel, 
2009) as well as constituting the central aim of decentralisation (Crawford and 
Hartmann, 2008; Ogbaharya, 2008) – the critical debate has raised some important 
issues for consideration. Hickey and Mohan (2004) highlight the importance of 
understanding the ways in which participation relates to existing power structures and 
political systems as a basis of moving forward.  Cornwall (2008) calls for more focus 
on participatory initiatives themselves in terms of who participates (and who does 
not), how they do so, and to what end.  Gaynor (2010) emphasises the importance of a 
vibrant public sphere in highlighting and promoting reflection on the opportunities 
provided by participatory processes and in maintaining a public spotlight on what 
happens within them.  Eversole (2012), in echoes of Robert Chambers’ seminal 
question ‘Whose reality counts?’ (Chambers, 1997), challenges community 
development practitioners and professionals to rethink their assumptions about 
knowledge, capacity and formal institutions within these spaces.  More specifically 
within African contexts characterised by high levels of distributional inequality, 
Larson and Ribot (2004) argue that community participation through elected or 
traditional authorities resembles a modern version of colonial indirect rule – effective 
as a means of managing labour and resources but ultimately avoiding the politics at 
the heart of community development.  Drawing specifically from a study of natural 
resource management in Ghana, Marfo (2007) echoes this, arguing that traditional 
institutions are not necessarily representative of or accountable to the populations 
over which they preside and that additional mechanisms that open the space for 
citizen participation are necessary.  Taken together, these contributions (and many 
others) highlight the intensely political nature of participative processes, the real 
challenges they pose to existing practices and cultures, and, depending on who is 
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involved (and informed), how and why, their potential to either transform or 
consolidate existing political relations.  Clearly, there is nothing simple about 
participation and, for those engaged in or supporting participative processes, there is 
much to consider.  So to what extent have these insights and contributions informed 
policy and practice on the ground, most particularly within agencies and among 
practitioners supporting so-called participatory initiatives?   
 
This question forms the basis for this article which draws on fieldwork conducted in 
2011 on local governance in Burundi.  I present evidence to show that, despite a 
promising legislative and institutional context explicitly aimed at broad-based 
community participation in local development, international support to the practical 
roll-out of local governance reforms has reverted to an instrumental, apolitical, 
technocratic approach.  When considered in an historical context, I argue that such an 
approach reproduces a dangerous old ‘tyranny’ – elite manipulation, exploitation and 
intimidation of communities in the name of ‘community participation’.  
 
I develop the argument as follows.  In the following section I set out the research 
design and methodology employed in the study and include an account of my own 
positionality and standpoint in this regard.  In the third section I present a brief 
historical overview of Burundi’s socio-political context together with the governance 
reforms providing for community participation introduced following the signing of 
the peace accord of 2000.  In the fourth section I present the findings from the 
fieldwork under five headings – direct community participation; representative 
participation; public awareness of and engagement in the process; public and official 
understandings of the participation; and supports offered to the new governance 
process.  I conclude with some practical lessons which may assist in realising the 
transformative potential of the opportunities offered by legislative and institutional 
reforms into the future.   
 
 
Research design and methodology 
 
The findings presented in this paper draw from a wider study of local governance and 
peacebuilding in the African Great Lakes region supported by both my own 
institution, Dublin City University (DCU) and the Irish non-governmental 
 6 
organisation (NGO) Trócaire which supports the work of local NGOs and 
community-based groups in a range of countries in the global South.  While I have a 
long history of collaboration with Trócaire, the study is not a traditional consultancy 
piece.  The research aims, design and methodology are my own and, rather than 
putting forward specific policy advice and/or recommendations as is common with 
consultancy research, my approach is to highlight what I feel are significant broader 
issues leaving Trócaire and its partners to deliberate on what this means for their work 
on the ground.  This particular paper has grown out of ongoing reflection and 
deliberation with Trócaire on what specifically staff, partners and the people they 
work with understand by the concept of participation and what this means for their 
work (including a two-day feedback workshop with Trócaire partners in Burundi, a 
webinar with Trócaire colleagues working in this area in eight countries worldwide, a 
presentation and exercise at Trócaire’s annual conference in Ireland, and ongoing 
email discussion).  As such, it represents a small (though not insignificant) part of the 
overall research and develops the conversations that have ensued with Trócaire 
colleagues over the past year.  From my own perspective, the overall research is 
normatively grounded in my own view (supported by the recent peacebuilding 
literature cited above) that state-building in fragile states needs to move from a focus 
on elites and elite-level institutions to an broader focus on inclusive and responsive 
political society including those heretofore marginalised and, at times, exploited by 
political elites.  The overall research project is designed to include both formal and 
informal governance arrangements in this conception of political society.  Field 
research in Burundi with both individuals and focus groups began with an exploration 
of how specific local issues (identified by participants) were addressed within the 
community.  It soon became apparent that issues are either fed through formal 
mechanisms or not dealt with at all.  As no informal governance arrangements were 
uncovered, the focus turned to the formal process of decentralisation and the 
opportunities this offers to communities. 
 
Field research for the Burundian case study was conducted by myself with translation 
from Kirundi to French, where necessary, provided by one of Trócaire’s local 
partners.  The research was carried out in January, August and September of 2011 
both in the capital Bujumbura and in 8 sites distributed across 5 of the country’s 17 
provinces.  The 8 sites were selected to reflect a cross-section of the country’s 
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population (in terms of population density, socio-economic conditions, ethnicity, and 
current levels of low-level conflict).  Overall I conducted 36 structured interviews 
(with 18 women and 18 men selected randomly on transect walks across the sites) and 
16 focus groups (gender disaggregated and comprising between 6 and 10 participants) 
with randomly selected community members across the 8 sites.  I later collated and 
coded the open ended responses to the structured interviews and processed these using 
SPSS software.  The aim of the focus groups was to explore the issues raised in 
structured interviews in more depth as well as to uncover any other relevant issues not 
covered by the interview schedule.  In addition, I conducted 8 semi-structured 
interviews with local (commune and hill level) officials and 9 semi-structured 
interviews with international and national level donors, ministry officials, NGO 
representatives and commentators in Bujumbura.  I also collated and analysed 
relevant legislative and policy material.  While this paper deals with just one aspect of 
the research, broader research findings are presented and analysed elsewhere (see 
Gaynor, 2011 and Gaynor, 2013). 
 
 
Burundi: A troubled past and an uncertain future  
 
Burundi is a small, densely populated country in central Africa.  It is also one of the 
poorest, most inequitable and most insecure regions on the continent.  Since attaining 
independence in 1962 the country has been plagued by internal conflict and violence, 
most recently a civil war which, breaking out in 1993, lasted over ten years.  
Involving widespread human rights violations, this has resulted in the social, 
economic and political exclusion of wide swathes of the country’s population. 
 
In the shadow of its neighbour Rwanda, there is a popular tendency to attribute the 
country’s problems to ethnic grievances alone (like Rwanda, Burundi possesses few 
natural resources).  However, more systematic analyses within the literature argue that 
that the causes of poverty, insecurity and conflict are more complex (Hammouda, 
1995; Lemarchand, 1996; Ndikumana, 2000; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000; 
Reyntjens, 2005; Uvin, 2008, 2009).   For these analysts, the roots and ongoing 
drivers of the country’s problems lie in the state apparatus itself – both the “predatory 
bureaucracy which cares only for its own interests” (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000: 
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370) and the struggles for economic resources among and across different groups of 
the political elite.  Peter Uvin expresses this succinctly… 
 
This system is at the core of Burundi’s problems. It is an institutionalized 
system of corruption, social exclusion, impunity, unpredictability, a total lack 
of accountability and clientelism. It has gorged itself for decades on aid 
money. Every Burundian knows this system, in which small groups of people 
use the state to advance their personal interests. It is the key problem and the 
main cause of war, not ethnicity or poverty. 
        (Uvin, 2008: 109-110) 
 
This system both relies on and has resulted in a citizenry which is frequently 
manipulated and/or intimidated by its leaders, with such manipulation and 
intimidation facilitated by the strongly hierarchical nature of social and political 
relations within the country.  These relations are rooted in both the county’s pre-
colonial monarchy and subsequent colonial rule facilitated, in part, through a rigid, 
top-down decentralisation structure introduced towards the end of the colonial period 
in 1959 (see also below) (Hammouda, 1995; Uvin, 2009).   
 
These egregious systemic problems were acknowledged by all involved in the peace 
negotiations of the late 1990s.  A central part of the final peace accord, which 
involved all but one of the principal rebel groups, was mediated by regional leaders 
(Julius Nyerere followed by Nelson Mandela) and signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 
2000, was the agreement to introduce a new decentralisation programme aimed at 
dividing power and resources across rural communities.  With assistance thereafter 
from international institutions, this new programme was written into the new 
Constitution of March 18th, 2005.  A Local Government Law was adopted that same 
year, a Decentralisation Policy was published in 2009, and local institutions were put 
in place with the first commune levels elections held in 2005 and hill level elections 
in 2010.    
 
As the relevant legislative and policy texts set out, this new model of governance 
envisages “a new state culture, a new politico-administrative spirit within the state…” 
(Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 56) which “aims at the active participation of all 
the population in defining and implementing economic and social development 
policies in their localities.” (Gouvernement de Burundi, 2009: 10).  In theory 
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therefore, the newly introduced programme is aimed at a radical political 
transformation, offering numerous opportunities for downward accountability and 
active citizen voice and participation in local affairs.  But how do these radical policy 
and institutional developments play out in practice and to what extent has 
international support to the process sustained its historically-rooted, politically-
centred approach?  In the following section I set out the principle findings in relation 
to this question.   
 
Participation in practice: Past tyrannies revisited?   
 
The principle findings in relation to how participation is playing out in practice on the 
ground are set out in this section. Following the issues introduced in the first section, 
the findings are presented under five main headings: direct community participation; 
representative participation; public awareness of and engagement in the new 
institutions; public and official understandings of participation in this context; and 
supports offered to the new governance reforms.   
 
Direct community participation  
A range of provisions for direct community participation are set out in the Local 
Government Law of 2005.  At commune level, council meetings, held three times a 
year, should be open to the public and minutes and decisions reached at these 
meetings should be posted on notice boards outside commune offices (Articles 10, 19 
Gouvernement de Burundi, 2005).  In addition, an annual progress report prepared by 
the commune Administrator should be made publicly available (Article 31).  Twice a 
year, direct community participation should be assured through public meetings 
between elected council members and local communities where participants may pose 
questions and propose ideas to commune council members (Article 15).  At the more 
local hill level, heads of hill councils should organise public meetings for all hill 
residents at least three times a year to collectively analyse local issues (Article 37). 
 
Although local officials are well aware of these provisions for direct community 
participation listing them in detail in interview when asked, few of these actually take 
place.  Of the 8 commune offices visited, just 2 had any relevant information posted 
on their notice boards.  One had posted a notice (in French which is not widely 
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spoken) of an upcoming meeting, while the other had, in line with the procedures set 
out, posted a record of deliberations and decisions taken from the previous meeting.  
None of the 8 communes visited had disseminated information on their annual 
budgets and none had carried out the required public meetings.  An exception to this 
are specific public meetings organised and attended by the administrative head of the 
commune council (Administrator) alone where the community is mobilised to collect 
taxes for specific local development projects determined by the commune council.  
This pattern is mirrored again at hill level where, of the 22 hill councils examined, 
council committee meetings were reported to be sporadic and no hill councils had 
held public meetings with communities.  Once again, an exception to this was 
meetings held to collect taxes and organise local community labour for specific 
projects as instructed by the commune Administrator.  When asked why meetings 
between elected officials and communities allowing for direct community 
participation beyond tax collection and labour mobilisation were not held, officials 
responded that such meetings prove too costly and no revenue has been made 
available to hold them.   
 
 
Representative participation 
In the relative absence of opportunities for direct community participation I also 
explored the efficacy of representative participation at both hill and commune level.  
As I have already noted, commune and hill level elections in 2005 and 2010 
respectively allow for participation through elected representatives.  The efficacy of 
this representation was explored by examining who these representatives are and how 
they represent their communities.  The party politicisation of the process at commune 
level – where candidates run in a grouping on a party list rather than as individual 
candidates – means that all commune representatives are active party members, 
accountable to their party superiors as much as, if not more than, their constituents.  
All councillors interviewed have been active party members for some time and spend 
more time in the capital than in their communes.  The only publicly accessible 
representative appears to be the Administrator and s/he appears to be only accessible 
to a limited number of people on an individual basis.  Of the 162 hill residents 
involved in this research, just 5 (4 men and 1 woman) have consulted with their 
Administrator over particular matters (the woman consulted a female Administrator).  
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Each of these 5 live in or in the vicinity of the commune centre.  For many others, in 
the words of one resident, “it [the commune council] is for people at a higher level” 
and many noted that it is not possible to personally access commune council members 
as only heads of the hill council or those with specific contacts can do this.   
 
The situation is somewhat different at the more local hill level where councils are 
made up of local non-party representatives who pose their candidature on an 
individual basis.  However, many of the newly elected representatives are traditional 
authorities and leaders from past systems.  Indeed, despite the radical new vision of 
the reforms, one of the most popular qualities in a local representative sought by 
voters interviewed (along with honesty and integrity) was a track-record and 
experience of ‘administration’.  The result appears to be a narrow and selective form 
of representation, mirroring that at commune level.  Only 6 out of the 162 residents 
consulted (4 men, 2 women) stated that they have gone to their hill council with issues 
to be resolved (the issues were disputes with neighbours over land boundaries (3 
male); theft in the home (1 male, 1 female); and family disputes arising from the 
widespread practice of ‘polygamy’ or wife abandonment (1 female)).  For those that 
have not approached their hill council, when asked why not, some noted that they 
have not yet had issues which need resolution, while others (predominantly women) 
pointed out that the issues they face are of no interest to their (predominantly male) 
council members.   
 
 
Public awareness of and engagement in the process 
The findings so far may appear somewhat surprising given the radical, transformative 
aspiration of the governance reforms.  Yet investigations into public awareness 
around these reforms revealed that communities remain largely unaware of them. 
None of the hill residents interviewed for the research had ever attended either a 
commune or a hill council meeting or knew that they could.  None were aware of the 
provisions for public meetings and direct community participation within these.  Just 
30 per cent of the residents interviewed had some idea of the role and activities of the 
commune council (roles cited were maintenance of peace and order and tax 
collection).  In contrast, 84 per cent of residents interviewed cited roles for the hill 
council.  The top two roles cited were local conflict resolution and the organisation of 
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community labour.  Thus, communities largely view their representative bodies as 
relatively remote top-down authorities regulating local affairs rather than as truly 
representative portals for their own views, ideas and plans as envisaged within the 
reform process.  This leads on to the question of what the different actors understand 
by the concept of participation in this context. 
 
Public and official understandings of participation 
Noting that participation was a central concept underpinning local governance 
reforms at the outset, all actors were asked how they saw community participation 
being assured within local processes and to what end.  For international sponsors of 
the programme (the EU, the World Bank and Co-operation Suisse), noting the serious 
shortfall in funding for local community projects, community participation was partly 
seen as a cost-sharing exercise where, through both labour and financial contributions, 
communities assist in funding specific projects and activities determined by commune 
councils or external agencies.  This is evidenced in the requirement for counterpart 
funding (in the form of local financial contributions and labour) for World Bank and 
the EU funded micro-projects at local level.  This interpretation was mirrored by local 
council officials (at both commune and hill levels) who talked of calling people to 
public meetings when money was to be collected or community labour / ‘community 
development works’ (CDWs – see also below) to be organised.  Community 
participation was thus, once again, viewed as a cost-sharing exercise.  As I have 
outlined above, for local community members themselves both hill and, most 
particularly, commune councils continue to be viewed more as authorities to be 
obeyed rather than as bodies to represent community interests.  And so many residents 
interviewed found the question on whether they ‘participate’ within their local 
structures difficult to understand.  When adjusted to a question on how they ‘interact’ 
with these structures, many mentioned participating in CDWs when instructed to do 
so by their community leaders.  For the majority of residents interviewed, this was 
their sole point of contact with their representative bodies. 
 
While clearly representing an instrumental view of participation, this understanding 
also reflects the current practice of travaux de développement communautaire’ 
(CDWs) – weekly (from 7am to noon each Saturday) obligatory community labour 
works organised by local authorities.  Every Saturday morning, be it in the state 
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capital Bujumbura, or in rural areas across the country, people can be seen working 
together under the supervision of their local leader in a range of areas – activities 
include construction, road maintenance, water drainage and anti-erosion measures, 
well/bore hole maintenance, reforestation/tree planting etc...  Although, in theory, 
everyone over the age of eighteen must report for work, participation in these CDWs 
appears to be somewhat uneven.  During my time in Burundi, I observed more women 
(including children certainly under the age of eighteen) than men engaged in these 
works in rural areas, and the absence of Burundi’s more affluent citizens both in rural 
areas and in the capital was apparent week after week.  These observations were 
supported by interview respondents who noted that this is indeed the trend.  While, in 
a country with such limited financial resources, such communal works are certainly 
useful in maintaining and perhaps even fostering shared ownership of and 
responsibility for common resources, the roots of this practice in both the colonial and 
pre-colonial era, where communal works were organised for the benefit of authorities 
and managed à la chicotte (by the whip) are important to note (see Guichaoua, 1991 
and Nsabimana, 1993 for fuller accounts of the continuities of this current practice 
with those of the past).   
 
Community participation, in the voiceless, powerless, and potentially exploitative 
form set out here in the form of CDWs represents a significantly different version to 
that set out in the texts, regulations and provisions underpinning the new 
decentralisation programme.  Indeed, it risks reproducing the old system of 
decentralisation first introduced by the Belgian authorities towards the end of the 
colonial period in 1959 and continued following independence in 1962.  As the 
Burundian political scientist Elias Sentamba (2011: 4) has written, this experience 
was not positive.  The system served as a system of political and social control, with 
authority exercised in a rigidly hierarchical top-down manner and community 
participation limited to carrying out the orders of local level officials and leaders who 
in turn reported to Provincial and central authorities.   
 
 
Participation without politics: The limitations of international support 
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Overall therefore, experiences on the ground point to a significant gap between the 
transformative roots of the reforms and their practical roll-out.  The final question 
which remains is why.  With this in mind, I examined the nature of international 
support to the process.  As well as involving the construction of commune offices, 
election monitoring and support in the preparation and dissemination of relevant texts, 
ongoing international support involves funding for micro-projects and training 
workshops for local officials and some select community members.  This training is 
often contracted out to local NGOs, and community members are selected by local 
officials.  Commune Administrators and officials interviewed for this research 
reported that they participate in, on average, two training workshops of between three 
and five days a month.  This amounts to between a third and a half of officials’ total 
working hours. None of the residents involved in this research had participated in, or 
were aware of, these workshops. 
 
While it lay beyond the remit of this particular research to comprehensively evaluate 
these workshops, interviews with both international sponsoring agencies and local 
NGOs contracted to carry out the training revealed that the focus lies very much at an 
administrative level, aimed at putting in place policies and procedures to account for 
budget spending rather than dealing with the more political transformations required.  
Administrators and local officials interviewed re-iterated this, drawing attention to the 
range of financial and administrative procedures covered by their training when 
questioned about its content. 
 
This apolitical, technocratic focus in international support has three potential 
consequences.  First, it reinforces traditional political hierarchies by creating insiders 
and outsiders – ‘experts’ (the trainers and trainees) and the rest.  This is antithetical to 
the political transformations underpinning the new governance reforms.  Second and 
very much related, the pedagogical style employed reinforces norms and assumptions 
among official and NGO staff about the superiority of expert knowledge.  Indeed, a 
recent comprehensive evaluation on the training programme run throughout the 
country by the World Bank is strongly critical of the top-down pedagogical style of 
trainers (Baltissan and Sentamba, 2011).  Rather than adapt their language and 
techniques to their groups, the evaluators note that trainers consistently deliver the 
same monotonous and directive ‘magisterial speeches’.  And so, in an environment 
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not conducive to accountability, local elites learn that they now know best, that it is 
their knowledge and capacity that ‘counts’, and that there is therefore little to be 
gained in engaging communities in direct participation through public meetings.  And 
third, the lack of broader public awareness campaigns on the new process means that 
there is little public debate on or awareness of the new political transformations 
entailed therein and therefore little incentive to promote them. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Transforming participation – some practical lessons 
 
A combination of factors has resulted in a gap between the transformative changes 
envisaged by architects of the new reforms and their practical roll-out on the ground.   
As the core political ambitions of the reforms have been over-written with a 
technocratic, administrative focus, the central concept underpinning them – 
community participation in both decision-making and actions at local level – has been 
lost.  Politics, within communes and on the hills, continues as ever, with 
accountability upward and community participation reduced to obligatory revenue 
generation and communal labour when demanded by authorities for projects and 
activities over which communities have no control.   
 
There are four valuable lessons here, both for those supporting the ongoing reforms in 
Burundi, but also for those interested in transforming participative processes more 
broadly.  The first is that participation is not just about local revenue generation and 
labour – i.e. cost-sharing.  It is inherently political.  Failure to acknowledge this in 
supporting so-called participative processes can undermine both the instrumental and 
political gains and reinforce old inequalities and tyrannies.  This means moving 
beyond participation as cost-sharing and paying attention to the existing cultures and 
practices into which it is introduced, thinking carefully about how to interact with 
these.  The second is that participation does not happen automatically.  If you build it 
(a ‘participative’ process/structure), ‘they’ will not just come.  For traditional power-
holders, participation means ceding a degree of power and control.  In a system 
benefitting them disproportionately, clearly this will not happen easily.  There will be 
no supply without demand.  Supporters of participative processes need therefore to 
think about how to stimulate this demand.  Rather than resorting to traditional 
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lobbying techniques, this may mean both raising public awareness of the opportunities 
and engaging with communities to learn what forms of participation prove most 
appropriate and useful to them (if indeed any).  The third is that participation never 
happens evenly.  It is often the powerful, the well-connected, the already advantaged 
who take their place at the table.  An unreflective application of the now widely 
critiqued model of procedural democracy means that there is never a place for 
everyone.  Reflecting a growing interest in post-liberal, more substantive models of 
democracy (see for example Mouffe, 1996; Young, 2000), the question to ask 
therefore is perhaps not so much ‘who participates?’, nor even ‘who do they 
represent?’, but rather ‘how do they represent (their people/constituents)’?  How do 
they mediate their interests and ambitions? Are they effective in this?  And the final 
lesson is that support to such processes requires a new form of engagement with 
communities – beginning by talking with them, not at them.  If you build it and they 
(the community) do not come, they probably have extremely good reasons for not 
doing so.  Meaningful support to participatory processes entails beginning where 
people are at and moving on from there.  For followers of traditional, mainstream 
views about knowledge and capacity (entrenched within the international 
development industry), this may well prove a challenge.   
 
The governance reforms introduced worldwide over the last two decades offer 
significant opportunities for meaningful, transformative participation, affording 
communities – in many cases for the first time – a real say in their own futures.  
While some analysts and commentators remain cynical and argue that these reforms 
represent yet another step in a relentless Western-driven neo-colonisation of the 
majority world, Burundian civil society activists see real potential in these 
developments and are keen to colonise these spaces themselves, transforming their 
own political society.  However, as this and as other cases have shown, if the 
opportunities available are not seized, supported and built upon in a politically and 
historically sensitive manner, they risk reproducing old tyrannies and abuses, in the 
process further alienating communities and undermining the effectiveness and 
sustainability of community development investments and initiatives.  The challenges 
are clearly great.  But so are the potential gains.  Within a progressive legislative and 
institutional context, it now falls to professionals and practitioners to interrogate their 
 17 
own values, frameworks and practices in working with states and communities to 
meet these challenges. 
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